Too little, too late
Source: By Prakash Chandra: Deccan Herald
The Indian Navy (IN) could have only raised a half-hearted toast on taking delivery of its first Scorpene submarine, INS Kalvari — for at least three reasons.
One, INS Kalvari was originally scheduled for delivery in 2012 by Mazagon Docks Ltd (MDL), which is also building five other Scorpene-class submarines under Project-75, with technology transfer from the French shipbuilder, Direction des Constructions Navales Services (DCNS). MDL, however, overshot the deadline by more than five years. This has translated into huge overruns in terms of time and cost and put a question mark on the scheduled induction of the second Scorpene, INS Khanderi, next summer, which is to be followed by the next four submarines at nine-month intervals.
The second reason for the navy’s muted cheer has to do with INS Kalvari’s firepower. With a range of 12,000 km and armed with precision-guided munitions, the boat is undoubtedly a significant addition to IN’s force multipliers. Weighing 1,565 tons, Scorpene-class submarines, with their small hulls, are particularly suited for operations in shallow littoral spaces, like that of the Arabian Sea where larger submarines like the Kilo-class would find manoeuvring difficult.
But INS Kalvari’s offensive capabilities are cramped by the absence of the most important weapons it should carry: torpedoes. A few months ago, New Delhi cancelled a $200 million contract with the Italian company Whitehead Alenia Sistemi Subacquei (WASS) for 98 Black Shark heavyweight torpedoes which were meant for INS Kalvari. WASS is a subsidiary of the Italian defence major Finmeccanica, which is under a cloud because of corruption charges involving another of its subsidiaries, Agusta Westland, over the supply of VVIP helicopters to India.
The third and perhaps the principal reason for the gloom in the navy relates to India’s fast-depleting submarine fleet strength. Ten Kilo-class submarines of Russian origin and four HDW vessels from Germany form the mainstay of the navy’s current underwater non-nuclear assets as it struggles to keep afloat its cherished goal of becoming a blue water fleet. The diesel-powered subs are becoming obsolete by the day and many of them need immediate upgrades, while the others are slated to be retired soon. That leaves less than half a dozen operational subs with the navy at a time when at least 18 non-nuclear subs are needed to defend India’s coastlines.
The navy currently operates two nuclear submarines: INS Chakra and the indigenously built INS Arihant. But INS Chakra does not bear nuclear arms — it is on lease from Russia and is prohibited under international law from sailing with a nuclear profile. Its main role, therefore, has been to serve as a prized training platform for the submarine crew of INS Arihant.
India is building two more nuclear subs in the Arihant class indigenously at Visakhapatnam, with Russia helping in miniaturising their nuclear reactors. But this still falls short of the six nuclear-powered attack subs (SSNs) and four nuclear-powered subs with nuclear-tipped missiles (SSBNs) which the navy would need to maintain strategic balance in the region.
India does not have a friendly neighbourhood, and most of its territories border the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea. Strategic experts believe the navy needs 24 submarines in the Indian Ocean region alone to maintain dominance over Bangladesh and Pakistan. It is hardly reassuring that Pakistan and China are expanding their naval fleets exponentially. The Pakistan Navy (PN) already operates PNS Hamza, which forms part of the trio of French Agosta-90Bs it operates. These submarines are equipped with air-independent propulsion (AIP) systems that help them stay submerged for much longer periods, making them harder to detect. (Advanced AIP systems allow subs to operate underwater for more than 10 days at stretch, while nuclear-powered vessels that can operate underwater for virtually unlimited periods).
From all accounts, Pakistan Navy is also trying to add four more advanced Type-214 AIP-equipped German submarines to its fleet. And if New Delhi decided on the Scorpene deal primarily with a strategic eye on Pakistan, today, it is more concerned about China — considered India’s main adversary in the Indian Ocean region. The People’s Liberation Army Navy operates 62 subs, including 10 nuclear-powered ones.
Deepening crisis
Against this background, it is deplorable that India’s 30-year Submarine Construction Programme, begun in 1999, is floundering. The navy’s initial expectation was to build a dozen conventional submarines in the country: six of them using western technology and six with Russian help. Indian engineers, or so the reasoning went, would then be able to make a dozen more vessels indigenously. But as deadlines slipped by with none of this happening, the crisis in the navy only deepened.
The feeble attempts made in recent years to address this issue were in vain and only the Krishnamurthy Committee’s recommendations in 2011 to open the submarine building to the private sector made some sense. The committee suggested inviting private sector investments through public-private partnerships. New Delhi seems to have taken this advice seriously, judging from the way it called for bids from foreign firms earlier this year to kickstart the long-delayed Project-75I (P-75I). The project, fast-tracked under the Make in India initiative’s Strategic Partnership policy, seeks to build six stealth submarines with AIP and land-attack missile capabilities. Navy sources say Russian, French, German, Swedish, Spanish and Japanese companies are in the race to partner with an Indian shipyard to win this $11 billion project.
Once implemented, this would obviate the need to import submarines and give Indian companies a toe-hold in the $25 billion — and growing — market now dominated by big players from other countries. Only then will India’s submarine modernisation plans finally gather some steam.
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