Today's Editorial

03 December 2016

Counter globalisation

 

Source: By Subrata Mukherjee: The Statesman

 

The US political process has developed within the parameters of geography and its unique history. This is exemplified by a strong tradition of isolationism and exceptionalism matched with considerable suspicion of a centralised political structure. It also incorporates the Jeffersonian ideal of a mass of small property owners with rough parity keeping alive the republican tradition even in a situation when such noble sentiments are on the decline or are retreating in Europe.

Besides, there are two strong traditions in the US. A tradition of predominance of economics over politics and also the perpetuation of the medieval practice of continuing with one person holding both the positions as the Head of State and that of government, a practice that persists because of American exceptionalism. With a strong Lockean heritage, the concepts of constitutionalism and limited government provide the bedrock of US democracy and liberalism. This is contextualised with suspicions of a centralised political and economic authority. In an essentially apolitical society with a great deal of insularity, there exist a large silent majority, as noted by President Nixon, a devout church whose members pay their taxes regularly and are generally law abiding.

This tranquility of the major support base, essential for any political party to have a winning coalition, was traumatised by globalisation and neo liberalism, which worked silently but firmly, in ensuring the unexpected victory of Donald Trump over Hillary Clinton in the 2016 Presidential election. Interestingly, in course of diagnosing this deep wound, both Bernie Sanders and Trump were correct in addressing the accumulated anger about a rigged economy and the government becoming an agent of corporations and multinationals, ignoring, insulting and provoking the multitudes of these silent law abiding citizens who existed in a condition of insecurity and anxiety in a society which became alien to their American dream. They complained of economic vulnerability and social exclusion.

The other serious issue was identity politics which was essentially divisive. To these important concerns, no authentic concern was expressed or explanation given by Clinton. Furthermore, she epitomised this alienated Washington establishment. With the exposure of the sensitive emails and the Clinton foundation, the door was closed for the Democrats to evolve a plausible antiestablishment strategy. Sanders’ exit left the ground open for Trump and allowed the latter to galvanize this popular upsurge against the political establishment.

Traditional politicians on both sides were suspect, seen as an oligarchic cartel. Wikileaks aggravated Clinton’s woes, reinforcing the resolve of the ordinary Americans to change even if it was a risky proposition, but one that was worth taking, hopefully restoring transparency and confidence. The choice of Hillary Clinton was wrong at a political juncture when the ordinary American saw her as a continuation of the Obama years with little change in policy. She was perceived as a politician of yesteryear, not fit for reconciling the fractured politics of Washington or to provide a new hope to the loss of tens of thousands of blue collar jobs especially in mining and allied industries. The promise of a minimum wage of $ 15 per hour was drowned with the cry of thousands who remained jobless for years.

The very context of US politics of bipartisanship was shaken up by Obamacare which was passed without a single Republican vote. The 1968 election brought back a lot of change in the Democratic Party nomination process with the dismantling of Delay’s machine politics, but the average voter today perceived the Democratic Party as a corporate entity rather than a party which once championed the cause of the organised working class and average Americans. The members of the ruling class were perceived to be corrupt and unconcerned with the needs, aspirations and anxieties of the average Americans. This was reflected not only by the defeat of the Democratic Party presidential candidature, but also the loss of many well-known Democratic candidates in the Congress. This ensured a comfortable Republican majority in both the House of Representatives and the Senate. The New Statesman simplistically sees it as a vote of racism and fears its repetition in Europe which is reeling under the impact of the Brexit vote. But this is only a partial truth. It was a rejection of identity politics which divides rather than unites people. This was accentuated by a perception of the American media which comprises urbanised elite that had contempt for the average American. The liberal bias of the media also fuelled greater anxiety and insecurity in the minds of the average American. The fear of liberal bias emanates from a few that a Supreme Court with a majority of liberal judges might tinker with the first ten amendments of the Constitution including the right to carry guns. As is well-known, the first ten amendments of the Constitution, also known as the Madisonian amendments, are the most important factors overriding the Constitution itself. The average American voter was not prepared for such a huge shift in the Constitution, based on checks and balances. It was amusing that many Hollywood personalities declared that they would leave the US if Trump won. It was seemingly rooted in confidence built on sand as the libertarian Lockeian liberalism had become an elitist liberalism both in the US and Western Europe. What was forgotten was that Liberalism, as Laski once described it, was a mood rather than a doctrine.

The endorsement of Clinton by most of the well-established liberal newspapers confirmed their alienation for the average American, non-college educated but steadfast in their loyalty to the nation. Surprisingly even the widely respected British weekly, The Economist, endorsed Clinton without realising the gap between the entrenched press and the perception of the ordinary people. Nixon had once remarked that the US does not need an American President for domestic policy. He has been proved wrong by history. We often forget that the US is also a nation-state, of course with exceptional characteristics. The average citizen has his own perceptions and views of immigration, job security and social balancing. The exhaustion of highly centralised impersonal politics in Washington has come to an end with the raising of more issues than solutions. But one aspect is fairly definite; specifically that new liberalism and unrestricted globalisation have been seriously halted by Trump’s victory. The world will have to settle for a different state-centric economic and political order based on the Westphalian state system. Liberalisation and globalisation will have to be worked out within the ambit of the nation-states. In the fulfilment of this imperative, the US is no exception.