Friends and neighbours -- I
Source: By Shubham Sharma: The Statesman
Rome was not built in a day. Neither was Indian foreign policy. Unlike other nations whose foreign policies had strong nationalist implications, Indian foreign policy had a strong internationalist thrust. Nehru’s association with the League against imperialism, MN Roy’s debate with Lenin on the question of imperialism at the inaugural session of the Second International, and Mahatma Gandhi's crusade against apartheid in South Africa are testimony to this. After the Partition of the subcontinent by the British colonialists, India displayed a steady continuance of its internationalist credentials, especially while dealing with neighbours on thorny issues. Nehru's appeal to the United Nations for the resolution of Kashmir, although subject to severe criticism by both his contemporaries and successors, was an instance of an overriding ‘internationalist normativity’ which would come in handy to resolve critical issues with neighbours amicably.
On the other side of the spectrum, India’s engagement with the Himalayan neighbours displayed, ironically, a strong realistic thrust. For instance, Nehru concluded unequal security treaties with Nepal and Bhutan primarily to keep China at bay. Such treaties culminated in the de facto christening of the region as ‘India’s sphere of influence’. Third, on the question of involvement in the internal affairs of neighbouring states, India has a legacy to preserve. Its unconditional support to the Mukti Bahini against the political and military onslaught of the West Pakistani establishment and India's military assistance provided to the state of Maldives under the nom de guerre of Operation Cactus to undermine an impending coup are instances to be emulated by regional powers of the world. However, the decision of the Indian government to land the Indian Peace Keeping Forces (IPKF) in the conflict-ridden Jaffna peninsula and the violent repercussions of vengeance culminating in the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi delineates the terms of engagement with neighbouring states.
Given that post-independence India saw Nehru stride like a colossus in foreign lands and much of Indian foreign policy was conducted by the Congress party or Congress-led coalitions, India’s engagement with its neighbours under the present government does not mark a radical break from tradition. In other words, the engagement with its neighbours has witnessed a sharp quantitative upsurge in bilateral engagements but qualitatively it has remained stagnant. However, the resolution of unrecognised and unclaimed enclaves with Bangladesh has been the most ostensible feather in the cap of the present dispensation. At the same time the fiasco on the Nepal border and that country’s gradual gravitation towards China as well as the undue criticism of its new Constitution on the EU platform, an act which India rescinded from in the face of grave and united opposition from all major political parties, stands out as the major failures of Indian dealings with its Himalayan neighbour.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi, after assuming power in the summer of 2014, brought about both fear and exuberance. The hawks and hardliners were sure that the present government would pursue a radical stance vis-à-vis Pakistan but were soon shaken out of their complacency when Mr Modi extended a warm welcome to Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on the eve of his swearing-in ceremony along with the leaders of other South Asian member-states. This came to be seen as a bold step towards reinstating the synergy which had faded into oblivion in the face of sporadic ceasefire violations on the Line of Control and terror attacks by non-state actors.
Unfortunately, the personal never transformed into the political. Soon relations were marred by ceasefire violations, terror attacks and the outspokenness of rabid political players on both sides. The Foreign Secretary level talks were the first casualty followed by the SAARC summit in Kathmandu where no consensus could be reached apparently because of the deadlock between India and Pakistan.
The Pathankot terror attacks followed by the alleged lobbying by the Pakistani Prime Minister with seventeen countries at the behest of China in order to scuttle India’s bid in the elite Nuclear Suppliers Group may well symbolise an asymptote which continuously reaches a curve (diplomatic convergence) but fails to meet it at any finite distance.
One of the major flaws in India’s dealings with Pakistan has been its inability to take the Pakistani military into confidence. The present government's undeniable majoritarian proclivity has naturally emboldened the Pakistani military's narrative of a ‘Hindu’ India which poses the greatest threat to its national identity. The role of the military in conducting foreign affairs of Pakistan, especially in dealing with India, came out in the open when Gen Musharraf who was both the Head of State as well as the head of the military came closest to clinching a four-point deal with India under Prime Minister Vajpayee and later during the UPA-I regime led by Dr Manmohan Singh.
Therefore, while the Modi government should continue engaging with the civilian leadership on a positive note which is vital for fomenting democracy in Pakistan, it should at the same time open potent Track-II diplomacy channels with Pakistan’s military establishment.
The present government’s engagement with the forbidden kingdom has been, at best minimal, if compared to the synergy and dynamism it displayed in its engagement with the US. Though PM Modi, during his days as the Chief Minister of Gujarat engaged with the Chinese political establishment the most, he has now chosen Japan under the ultra-nationalist government of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to conduct joint military exercises and major commercial and infrastructural ventures like the “bullet train”. The Indian government has not moved beyond Buddha in its engagement with China. It is true that India and China have had a shared cultural history of which Buddhism is an inseparable part, but the present Communist regime which is epistemologically couched in materialism looks for tangible politico-economic commitments.
The discourse of perennial neglect of China followed by the erstwhile establishments now demands a serious course correction. It is this neglect on the part of India which has culminated in a Pakistan-China axis, which Andrew Small refers to as ‘Asia’s new geo-politics’.
The camaraderie between the two has reached such a point that it would not be wrong to label Pakistan as China’s Israel. China’s stay in labeling Masood Azhar as an international terrorist followed by India's response to grant visa to Uighur leader Dolkun Isa, which it had to withdraw unconditionally as his name had a red corner notice attached to it, are ominous developments.
The present storm over India’s membership of the prestigious Nuclear Suppliers Group has a strong China element to it. China is demanding a de jure entry of Pakistan into the NSG if India is allowed the membership despite not being a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).
This has its roots in the Indo-US nuclear deal which has succeeded only in a no-confidence motion in the Indian Parliament, generation of deep-seated anxieties in both Pakistan and China and the bid to import expensive nuclear reactors from US commercial enterprises which have had an unscrupulous track record. Strategic analysts also foresee a nuclear deal between Pakistan and China on the anvil. The implication of this would be an emboldened Pakistan and the dream of a nuclear-free South Asia fading into oblivion.
