GS Paper III

News Excerpt:

Though 15 years have passed since the 26/11 sea-borne terror attack on Mumbai, serious loopholes persist in India’s coastal security.

Loopholes that persist in India’s Coastal Security:

• Flawed measures: The measures to defend India’s 7517 km coastline are full of glaring loopholes.
  • Indian intelligence officials (RAW) and USA sources both had given prior warnings about the probability of a major sea-borne attack on Mumbai. However, a lack of specificity in the intelligence prevented specific responses.
• Less coordination in Security: Many agencies involved (15 of them) in maritime security are acting without coordination. Despite the best efforts of the National Committee for Strengthening Maritime and Coastal Security (NCSMCS), the coordination of coastal security is ad hoc.
  • Unfortunately, the coastal security bill with a proposal to form a National Maritime Authority (NMA) has been caught in red tape since 2013.
• Ineffective monitoring: The 26/11 attack highlighted India’s inability to monitor its coastline effectively.
  • Moreover, in April 2017, when a Russian couple on a sailing boat drifted close to the Mumbai harbour without being noticed by any security agency. The vessel was noticed and reported by fishermen.
• Non-updated Security system: The Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) report recently observed glaring loopholes in Odisha State’s coastal security setup. Patrol boats were under-utilized, and shore-based infrastructure, including manpower, showed shortages. Funds went unspent.
• Lack of National Interests: Generally, more interest is shown in deep-sea security than coastal security, although the former is more capital-intensive. Port security has emerged as one of the most neglected areas in littoral security architecture.
  • 187 minor ports had minimal security cover and 75 had no security cover at all.
  • For example, in Tamil Nadu (a state with some experience in fighting LTTE sea tigers), State administrations have not responded suitably to the need for littoral security.

Government Initiatives:

• Integrating management: Following 26/11, the Central government set up a three-tier security arrangement comprising the Indian Navy (IN), the Indian Coast Guard (ICG) and the State Marine Police, jointly safeguarding India’s maritime zone. 
  • There are joint exercises in the Arabian Sea and Bay of Bengal. “Sagar Kavach” exercises involving the Navy, ICG and the State coastal police were held.
• Updating the security system: Coastal police stations and a surveillance infrastructure under a Coastal Security Scheme (CSS) were set up. Radar stations came up along the coastline. Automatic Identification Systems and Joint Operation Centres (JOCs) were set up (to some extent).
  • Coastal radar chains are set up. The National Command and Control Communications Intelligence Network (N3CIN), the Maritime Domain Awareness Plan and the Information Management and Analysis Centre (IMAC) have come into play.
• High-profile undertakings: The Coast Guard acknowledges improvements in the security architecture, particularly inter-agency cooperation, but points out those high-technology initiatives alone will not ensure foolproof security. The States Marine or Coastal police have to play a major role; for this, they must be trained, equipped and motivated.

Mains PYQs

Q. How far are India’s internal security challenges linked with border management particularly in view of the long porous borders with most countries of South Asia and Myanmar? (UPSC 2013)

Q. What are the maritime security challenges in India? Discuss the organizational, technical and procedural initiatives taken to improve the maritime security. (UPSC 2022)